Complementary Slackness

Lemma 2

Assume a linear program $P = \max\{c^Tx \mid Ax \leq b; x \geq 0\}$ has solution x^* and its dual $D = \min\{b^Ty \mid A^Ty \geq c; y \geq 0\}$ has solution y^* .

- **1.** If $x_j^* > 0$ then the *j*-th constraint in *D* is tight.
- **2.** If the *j*-th constraint in *D* is not tight than $x_i^* = 0$.
- **3.** If $y_i^* > 0$ then the *i*-th constraint in *P* is tight.
- **4.** If the *i*-th constraint in P is not tight than $y_i^* = 0$.

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If we say that a variable x_j^* (y_i^*) has slack if $x_j^* > 0$ ($y_i^* > 0$), (i.e., the corresponding variable restriction is not tight) and a contraint has slack if it is not tight, then the above says that for a primal-dual solution pair it is not possible that a constraint **and** its corresponding (dual) variable has slack.

Proof: Complementary Slackness

Analogous to the proof of weak duality we obtain

$$c^T x^* \leq y^{*T} A x^* \leq b^T y^*$$

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From the constraint of the dual it follows that $y^TA \ge c^T$. Hence the left hand side is a sum over the product of non-negative numbers. Hence, if e.g. $(y^TA - c^T)_j > 0$ (the j-th constraint in the dual is not tight) then $x_j = 0$ (2.). The result for (1./3./4.) follows similarly.

Brewer: find mix of ale and beer that maximizes profits

max
$$13a + 23b$$

s.t. $5a + 15b \le 480$
 $4a + 4b \le 160$
 $35a + 20b \le 1190$
 $a, b \ge 0$

Entrepeneur: buy resources from brewer at minimum cost C, H, M: unit price for corn, hops and malt.

min
$$480C$$
 + $160H$ + $1190M$
s.t. $5C$ + $4H$ + $35M \ge 13$
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Note that brewer won't sell (at least not all) if e.g. 5C + 4H + 35M < 13 as then brewing ale would be advantageous.

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Marginal Price:

- How much money is the brewer willing to pay for additional amount of Corn, Hops, or Malt?
- ▶ We are interested in the marginal price, i.e., what happens if we increase the amount of Corn, Hops, and Malt by ε_C , ε_H , and ε_M , respectively.

The profit increases to $\max\{c^Tx \mid Ax \leq b + \varepsilon; x \geq 0\}$. Because of strong duality this is equal to

$$\begin{array}{lll}
\min & (b^T + \epsilon^T)y \\
\text{s.t.} & A^T y & \geq c \\
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If ϵ is "small" enough then the optimum dual solution y^* might not change. Therefore the profit increases by $\sum_i \varepsilon_i y_i^*$.

Therefore we can interpret the dual variables as marginal prices.

- If the brewer has slack of some resource (e.g. com) then he is not willing to pay anything for it (corresponding dual
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
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
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
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
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
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













The change in profit when increasing hops by one unit is $= c_R^T A_R^{-1} e_h$.



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$$=\underbrace{c_B^T A_B^{-1}}_{\mathcal{V}^*} e_h.$$

Of course, the previous argument about the increase in the primal objective only holds for the non-degenerate case.

If the optimum basis is degenerate then increasing the supply of one resource may not allow the objective value to increase.